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Warner Norcross + Judd LLP is a corporate law firm with over 230 attorneys serving clients in nine offices throughout Michigan. Among the largest law firms in Michigan, Warner works in virtually all areas of business law.

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On June 26, 2024, the Supreme Court decided <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-108_8n5a.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Snyder v. United States</a>, which resolved a circuit split regarding the scope of a core federal public-corruption statute, 18 U.S.C. §&nbsp;666. The question presented was whether §&nbsp;666 covers gratuities — that is, payments made to public officials after official acts as rewards or tokens of appreciation — as well as bribes. The court held that the answer is no.

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The case arose after former Portage, Indiana, mayor James Snyder requested and accepted $13,000 from a local truck vendor roughly a year after Portage bought new garbage trucks from the vendor. The federal government caught wind of the payment and suspected that it was a gratuity for the city’s garbage-truck purchase. The government charged Snyder with accepting an illegal gratuity under §&nbsp;666, and a jury convicted him.

Throughout, Snyder contended that the statute was intended to cover only bribery — i.e., payments made or agreed to before an official act to influence the official act. Both the district court and the court of appeals disagreed.

The Supreme Court adopted Snyder’s position. Although §&nbsp;666 uses the term “rewarded” in connection with an official act — seemingly reaching gratuities — the court explained that the statute also says that any reward must be received “corruptly.” Looking to other bribery and gratuity statutes, the court concluded that the term “corruptly” signals a prohibition on bribes, not gratuities. As a result, a reward given after an official act under a pre-act agreement is a bribe that falls within the statute’s scope, but a reward given after the act with no agreement beforehand is not.

Justice Gorsuch concurred. His opinion emphasized that the majority’s reading of §&nbsp;666 follows directly from the rule of lenity. In his view, any fair reader would have doubts about the statute’s scope, and, under the rule of lenity, those doubts must be resolved in favor of the would-be defendant, not the government.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented. Her opinion contended that the majority’s reading was inconsistent with §&nbsp;666’s plain text and purpose.

For questions about this case, please contact Charlie Quigg, a member of Warner’s White Collar <a>Criminal Defense Practice Group</a>, or your Warner attorney.

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Charles R. “Charlie” Quigg

Appellate and Supreme Court Practice

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Supreme Court Decision in Snyder v. United States Narrows Scope of Federal Bribery Statute

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Supreme Court Decision in Snyder v. United States Narrows Scope of Federal Bribery Statute

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