In People v. Solloway (324559), the Court of Appeals struck another blow to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) holding that the requirements under MCL 28.727(1)(h) and (i) for defendants to register “routinely used” email addresses and cell phone numbers are unconstitutionally vague. This holding comes as the Sixth Circuit is considering an appeal of a recent Eastern District of Michigan opinion in Doe v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 3d 672 (2015). In Doe, Judge Robert H. Cleland similarly concluded that the term “routinely used” as stated in MCL 28.727(1)(h) and (i) does not have a sufficiently concrete meaning to quantify the cellphone and email usage that triggers the registration requirement. In light of Doe, the Michigan Attorney General did not contest the defendant’s argument on this issue on appeal.
Solloway was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I) and two counts of failing to comply with the SORA after he did not register an email address and cell phone number. He appealed arguing that the terms “routinely used” as used in MCL 28.727(1)(h) and (i) does not provide a fair notice to defendant or state a useful standard for law enforcement officers to apply when administering the statute. The COA agreed and held that the term “routinely used” in MCL 28.727(1)(h) and (i) is open to many different and inconsistent interpretations and views by judges and law enforcement officers.
The defendant also unsuccessfully appealed his conviction based on sufficiency of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and admission of certain evidence at trial.
