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Warner Norcross + Judd LLP is a corporate law firm with over 230 attorneys serving clients in nine offices throughout Michigan. Among the largest law firms in Michigan, Warner works in virtually all areas of business law.

Michigan Law Firm - Warner Norcross + Judd LLP

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&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In 2010, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided four cases that considered the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of testator or settlor’s intentions regarding a will or trust agreement: In re William J. and Marian A. Dudley Trust;<a href="#_edn1" id="_ednref1">1</a>In the Matter of Kenneth A. Hope Trust No. 1;<a href="#_edn2" id="_ednref2">2</a>In re Estate of Luscinda Jane Stillson;<a href="#_edn3" id="_ednref3">3</a> and In the Matter of the Jack E. Crane Trust.<a href="#_edn4" id="_ednref4">4</a>&nbsp; Notably, in three of the four decisions, the Court of Appeals reversed the underlying Probate Court rulings, which suggests that some uncertainty exists in this area of the law.&nbsp; This article will review the Court of Appeals’ statement of the law governing admissibility of extrinsic evidence from the 2010 cases; summarize the facts and holdings of the 2010 cases; and provide commentary on the judicial rulings in the 2010 cases.

II.&nbsp;COURT OF APPEALS’ STATEMENT OF THE LAW CONCERNING

ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF

TESTATOR OR SETTLOR’S INTENT:

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In the cases under consideration, the Court of Appeals expounded on Michigan law concerning the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of testator or settlor’s intentions regarding a will or trust agreement, primarily in the context of an action to interpret the meaning of an instrument (as opposed to a petition to reform an instrument). &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Initially, the same rules of construction apply to both types of instruments.&nbsp; “‘The rules of construction applicable to wills also apply to the interpretation of trust documents.’”<a href="#_edn5" id="_ednref5">5</a>&nbsp; Confronted with a question as to the meaning of a will or trust agreement, the Court’s primary objective is to carry out the intention of the testator or settlor.&nbsp; “‘In resolving a dispute concerning the meaning of a will or trust, the court's sole objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the testator or settlor.’”<a href="#_edn6" id="_ednref6">6</a>&nbsp; “‘A fundamental precept which governs the judicial review of wills is that the intent of the testator is to be carried out as nearly as possible.’”<a href="#_edn7" id="_ednref7">7</a>&nbsp; “‘The primary goal of the court in construing a will is to effectuate, to the extent consistent with the law, the intent of the testator.’”<a href="#_edn8" id="_ednref8">8</a> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Barring any ambiguity, the Court is to determine the testator or settlor’s intent solely from the language of the instrument itself.&nbsp; “In determining the settlor's intent under Michigan law, the court must ‘first look to the expression of the intent in the instrument in question and construe the instrument so that each word contained therein has meaning, if it is possible so to do.’”<a href="#_edn9" id="_ednref9">9</a>&nbsp; “‘[A] court gives effect to the drafter's intent as indicated in the plain language of the will.&nbsp; The will must be read as a whole and harmonized, if possible, with the intent expressed in the document.’”<a href="#_edn10" id="_ednref10">10</a>&nbsp; “Unless an ambiguity exists, a court should glean the testator's intent from the document itself.”<a href="#_edn11" id="_ednref11">11</a>&nbsp; “‘[A] court may not construe a clear and unambiguous will in such a way as to rewrite it[.]’”<a href="#_edn12" id="_ednref12">12</a> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Court must construe an unambiguous will or trust agreement solely by reference to its language and without reference to extrinsic evidence.&nbsp; “‘[T]he law is loath to supplement the language of [testamentary] documents with extrinsic information . . . . because the maker is not available to provide additional facts or insight.’”<a href="#_edn13" id="_ednref13">13</a>&nbsp; This rule precludes consideration of the testimony of the attorney who drafted the instrument.&nbsp; “‘[T]estimony of the scrivener of a mistake in drafting a will or of an intention of testator different from that expressed in the will is not admissible, in the absence of ambiguity or mistake appearing upon the face of the will.’”<a href="#_edn14" id="_ednref14">14</a> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Only where the will or trust agreement contains an ambiguity may the Court consider evidence outside the four corners of the document.&nbsp; “[I]f the intent of the testator cannot be gleaned solely by reference to the will because there is an ambiguity, the court may discern the intent of the testator through extrinsic sources.’”<a href="#_edn15" id="_ednref15">15</a>&nbsp; “‘If ambiguity exists, the court must look outside the document in order to carry out the settlor's intent, and may consider the circumstances surrounding the creation of the document and the general rules of construction.’”<a href="#_edn16" id="_ednref16">16</a>&nbsp; “In resolving an ambiguity in a trust document, the primary goal is to determine and enforce the settlors’ intent as nearly as possible.”<a href="#_edn17" id="_ednref17">17</a> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; There are two types of ambiguities: patent and latent.&nbsp; “‘A patent ambiguity exists if the uncertainty as to meaning appears on the face of the instrument, and arises from the defective, obscure, or insensible language used.&nbsp; A latent ambiguity, on the other hand, arises where the language employed is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence creates the possibility of more than one meaning.’”<a href="#_edn18" id="_ednref18">18</a>&nbsp; “Extrinsic evidence is also admissible to prove the existence of a latent ambiguity.”<a href="#_edn19" id="_ednref19">19</a>

III.&nbsp;ANALYSIS OF COURT OF APPEALS’ EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE DECISIONS FROM 2010:

A.&nbsp;In re William J. and Marian A. Dudley Trust Dudley Trust: &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 1. Case Summary: In Dudley Trust, William J. Dudley and Marian A. Dudley, husband and wife, acting as co-settlors, created their revocable trust.&nbsp; After the death of the first co-settlor, the trust agreement directed the trustee to make the following distributions from the marital trust established thereunder: (1) a sum equal to 0.142857% of the marital trust to the trustee of a separate discretionary trust for the benefit of William’s first sister; (2) a sum equal to 0.142857% of the marital trust to William’s second sister outright; (3) a sum equal to .0035714% of the marital trust to each of three named charities; and (4) the remaining balance of the marital trust divided equally among 23 named individuals. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Following the death of William (the first co-settlor to die), the trustee petitioned the Probate Court for instructions concerning distribution of the trust assets.&nbsp; “Petitioner calculated that if he distributed the trust assets in conformity with the percentage allocations in the trust document, [William’s sisters] would each take $1,345.57, the three charities would each get $33.64, and the remaining 23 individuals would each receive $40,830.92.”<a id="_ednref20" href="#_edn20">20</a>&nbsp; William’s sisters appeared in response to the petition. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; William’s sisters alleged that the attorney who drafted the trust agreement had made a mathematical mistake “whereby she first stated the percentages in numerical number and then followed it with a percentage sign which essentially had the effect of moving the decimal over two points.”<a id="_ednref21" href="#_edn21">21</a>&nbsp; The sisters sought discovery of the drafting attorney’s file for any information it might provide regarding William’s intentions.&nbsp; However, the trustee presented testimony by another attorney who represented co-settlor Marian after William’s death (Marian having died by the time the hearing on the petition was held).&nbsp; Marian’s attorney “recalled that he had appraised Marian Dudley of the unusual distribution percentages in the trust agreement, but she emphatically replied that ‘she didn’t want to make any changes.’”<a id="_ednref22" href="#_edn22">22</a> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Probate Court denied the sisters’ request for discovery of the drafting attorney’s file and instructed the trustee to distribute the marital trust assets as set forth in the trust agreement: “[I]’m satisfied that any concerns as to the validity of those percentages of distribution had been addressed by [Marian’s attorney] and had been explained to his satisfaction and that there would be no reason for this Court to deviate from the four corners of this document or find that the terms and conditions of this trust are not, in fact, the intent of the settlor…”<a id="_ednref23" href="#_edn23">23</a>&nbsp; William’s sisters appealed. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Court of Appeals analyzed the case under the law governing construction of ambiguities, despite the allegation by William’s sisters that a mistake had been made.&nbsp; Initially, the Court of Appeals decided that no patent ambiguity was present.&nbsp; “As reflected in petitioner’s proposed distribution table, the trust assets were capable of being distributed in conformity with the actual terms of the trust.&nbsp; Thus, these distribution provisions do not qualify as patently ambiguous, and the probate court correctly so held.”<a id="_ednref24" href="#_edn24">24</a> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; But the Court of Appeals went on to identify the existence of a potential latent ambiguity.&nbsp; “[R]espondents have demonstrated the potential existence of a latent ambiguity with respect to the trust agreement’s allocation percentages.”<a id="_ednref25" href="#_edn25">25</a>&nbsp; According to the Court of Appeals, three factors supported the conclusion that a latent ambiguity might exist.&nbsp; First, the Probate Court considered extrinsic evidence (i.e., the testimony by Marian’s attorney), which would only have been proper if an ambiguity was present.&nbsp; Second, the discrepancy between the small (“nominal”) amount of the distribution to the trust for William’s first sister and the large amount of the distributions to the remainder beneficiaries was “unusual”, according to the Probate Court.&nbsp; (This discrepancy also existed with regard to the gift outright to William’s second sister, although it was overlooked by the Court of Appeals.)&nbsp; Third, the record showed that co-settlors William and Marian themselves had established the separate discretionary trust for the benefit of William’s first sister, likely at substantial expense, “which would have made little sense if the settlors intended the discretionary trust to receive only the nominal amount set forth in the settlors’ trust.”<a id="_ednref26" href="#_edn26">26</a>

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Because of the potential existence of a latent ambiguity, the Court of Appeals held that the Probate Court erred, both by not considering extrinsic evidence of the co-settlors’ intentions at the time of the creation of the trust (such as the drafting attorney’s case file), and by instead considering irrelevant evidence – the testimony of Marian’s attorney – which related to a point in time long after the creation of the trust.&nbsp; “Consequently, we reverse the probate court’s [order] and remand for further proceedings regarding ascertainment of the settlors’ intent at the time they created the William J. and Marian A. Dudley Trust.”<a id="_ednref27" href="#_edn27">27</a> &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 2. Commentary: The Probate Court and the Court of Appeals both correctly found that there was no patent ambiguity in the trust agreement; that is, no uncertainty as to meaning appeared on the face of the instrument.&nbsp; The reason why there was no uncertainty on the face of the instrument was that the percentage figures used in the trust agreement reflected mathematical precision and had only a single possible meaning.&nbsp; For example, “0.142857% of the marital trust” meant trust assets having a value equal to 0.00142857 of the trust, which equated to the sum of $1,345.57.&nbsp; As the Court of Appeals recognized, “the trust assets were capable of being distributed in conformity with the actual terms of the trust.”<a id="_ednref28" href="#_edn28">28</a> &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A latent ambiguity requires that the language employed in the instrument must have more than one possible meaning, as showed by some extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence.&nbsp; Because the percentage figures used in the trust agreement reflected mathematical precision and had only a single possible meaning, it was simply not possible for any extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence to show the existence of a latent ambiguity.&nbsp; To continue our example, nothing would show that “0.142857% of the marital trust” meant anything other than trust assets having a value equal to 0.00142857 of the trust.&nbsp; Simply put, the percentage figures were the percentage figures.&nbsp; Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred when it professed to find the existence of a potential latent ambiguity. &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In fact, the Court of Appeals never identified any uncertainty as to the meaning of the percentage figures used in the trust agreement.&nbsp; Instead, the Court of Appeals identified several reasons why the percentage figures might be inconsistent with, and fail to accurately set forth, the settlor’s intentions.&nbsp; Of course, if the percentage figures failed to accurately set forth the settlor’s intentions, then the percentage figures represented a mistake, not an ambiguity.&nbsp; The Court of Appeals should have considered whether a mistake was evident on the face of the instrument.&nbsp; If there was no evident mistake (and in this author’s view, there was none), then the contents of the scrivener’s file should have been inadmissible to vary the meaning of the trust agreement.&nbsp; “‘[T]estimony of the scrivener of a mistake in drafting a will or of an intention of testator different from that expressed in the will is not admissible, in the absence of ambiguity or mistake appearing upon the face of the will.’”<a id="_ednref29" href="#_edn29">29</a> &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; If the suggested correct outcome seems harsh, it could have been circumvented by bringing a different type of action – a petition to reform the trust agreement based on a scrivener’s error.&nbsp; “[M]ichigan caselaw [h]as recognized the equitable power of a court to reform the terms of an instrument, including a trust if it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the settlor’s intent and the terms of the instrument were affected by a mistake.”<a id="_ednref30" href="#_edn30">30</a>&nbsp; The distinction being drawn is between an action to construe the meaning of an instrument through interpretation (such as Dudley Trust), and an action to reform the terms of an instrument based upon mistake. &nbsp; B.&nbsp;In the Matter of Kenneth A. Hope Trust No. 1: &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 1.&nbsp;Case Summary: In Hope Trust, the settlor’s trust agreement “included a provision whereby each niece and nephew [of settlor] was to receive $2,500 upon [the settlor’s] death.”<a id="_ednref31" href="#_edn31">31</a>&nbsp; After settlor’s death, the successor trustee petitioned the Probate Court to reform the trust agreement so as to eliminate the gift provision for the nieces and nephews.&nbsp; One of the settlor’s nephews objected to the petition.&nbsp; The successor trustee presented an affidavit from the attorney who prepared the most recent version of the trust agreement, averring that the settlor intended to eliminate the gift provision for the nieces and nephews, but that the attorney had failed to draft the trust agreement consistent with the settlor’s intentions.&nbsp; The Probate Court granted the successor trustee’s motion for summary disposition, finding that the “evidence clearly and convincingly established a scrivener’s error”, and ordered the trust agreement reformed to eliminate the gift provision for the nieces and nephews.<a id="_ednref32" href="#_edn32">32</a> &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On appeal, the Court of Appeals noted three key factors.&nbsp; First, there was no claim that the gift provision contained a patent ambiguity.&nbsp; Second, there was no claim that the gift provision contained a latent ambiguity.&nbsp; Third, there was “nothing on the face of the trust as a whole to indicate that there was a scrivener’s error.”<a id="_ednref33" href="#_edn33">33</a>&nbsp; Consequently, because there was no ambiguity or mistake evident in the trust agreement, the Probate Court was required to determine the settlor’s intention from the trust agreement itself.&nbsp; “[E]xtrinsic evidence was not admissible to show that [the settlor] meant the opposite of what is expressly stated in [the gift provision.]”<a id="_ednref34" href="#_edn34">34</a>&nbsp; The trust agreement included the gift provision; therefore, it was the settlor’s intent to make the gift to the nieces and nephews, and the Probate Court erred by reforming the trust agreement to eliminate the gift provision.<a id="_ednref35" href="#_edn35">35</a>

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; This review of the Court of Appeals’ 2010 extrinsic evidence cases suggests that Courts and litigants should carefully differentiate between ambiguities and mistakes in order to reach the right outcome.&nbsp; Courts and litigants should also distinguish between proceedings to construe an instrument and proceedings to reform an instrument because these proceedings are subject to different legal principles.&nbsp; It seems inevitable that litigants to trust and estate proceedings will continue to try and introduce extrinsic evidence of the decedent’s intentions to promote their own interests, and so this area of the law promises to continue to be frequently litigated.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a href="/people/david-l-skidmore/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">David L. Skidmore</a> is a partner in the Grand Rapids office of Warner Norcross + Judd LLP.&nbsp; He specializes in trust and estate litigation as well as real property litigation.&nbsp; Mr. Skidmore can be reached at <a href="mailto:dskidmore@wnj.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">dskidmore@wnj.com</a>.

<a href="#_ednref1" id="_edn1">1</a>In re William J. and Marian A. Dudley Trust, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 16, 2010 (Docket No. 287918).

<a href="#_ednref2" id="_edn2">2</a>In the Matter of Kenneth A. Hope Trust No. 1, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 20, 2010 (Docket No. 290084).

<a href="#_ednref3" id="_edn3">3</a>In re Estate of Luscinda Jane Stillson, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 29, 2010 (Docket No. 286777).

<a href="#_ednref4" id="_edn4">4</a>In the Matter of the Jack E. Crane Trust, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 2, 2010 (Docket No. 293006).

<a href="#_ednref5" id="_edn5">5</a>Crane Trust, 2010 WL 4905205, at *3, quoting In re Reisman Estate, 266 Mich App 522, 527; 702 NW2d 658 (2005).

<a href="#_ednref6" id="_edn6">6</a>Hope Trust, 2010 WL 1573794, at *1, quoting In re Nowels Estate, 128 Mich App 174, 177; 339 NW2d 861 (1983).

<a href="#_ednref7" id="_edn7">7</a>Dudley Trust, 2010 WL 935643, at *2, quoting In re Kremlick Estate, 417 Mich 237, 240; 331 NW2d 228 (1983).

<a href="#_ednref8" id="_edn8">8</a>Stillson Estate, 2010 WL 2594930, at *3, quoting In re Raymond Estate, 483 Mich 48, 52; 764 NW2d 1 (2009) (citations and quotations omitted).

<a href="#_ednref9" id="_edn9">9</a>Hope Trust, 2010 WL 1573794, at *1, quoting Detroit Bank &amp; Trust Co v Grout, 95 Mich App 253, 268-269; 289 NW2d 898 (1980).

<a href="#_ednref10" id="_edn10">10</a>Stillson Estate, 2010 WL 2594930, at *3, quoting Raymond Estate, 483 Mich at 52 (citations and quotations omitted).

<a href="#_ednref11" id="_edn11">11</a>Dudley Trust, 2010 WL 935643, at *2, citing Kremlick Estate, 417 Mich at 240.

<a href="#_ednref12" id="_edn12">12</a>Stillson Estate, 2010 WL 2594930, at *4, quoting In re Allen Estate, 150 Mich App 413, 417; 388 NW2d 705 (1986)

<a href="#_ednref13" id="_edn13">13</a>Dudley Trust, 2010 WL 935643, at *3, quoting Kremlick Estate, 417 Mich at 240.

<a href="#_ednref14" id="_edn14">14</a>Stillson Estate, 2010 WL 2594930, at *4, quoting Burke v Central Trust Co, 258 Mich 588, 592; 242 NW 760 (1932).

<a href="#_ednref15" id="_edn15">15</a>Id. at *3, quoting Raymond Estate, 483 Mich at 52 (citations and quotations omitted).

<a href="#_ednref16" id="_edn16">16</a>Crane Trust, 2010 WL 4905205, at *3, quoting In re Kostin Estate, 278 Mich App 47, 53; 748 NW2d 583 (2008)

<a href="#_ednref17" id="_edn17">17</a>Dudley Trust, 2010 WL 935643, at *3, citing Kremlick Estate, 417 Mich at 240.

<a href="#_ednref18" id="_edn18">18</a>Id. at *2, quoting Kremlick Estate, 417 Mich at 240 (internal quotation omitted).

<a href="#_ednref19" id="_edn19">19</a>Hope Trust, 2010 WL 1573794, at *1 n 2, citing Kremlick Estate, 417 Mich at 241.

<a href="#_ednref20" id="_edn20">20</a>Dudley Trust, 2010 WL 935643, at *1.

<a href="#_ednref21" id="_edn21">21</a>Id. (internal quotation omitted).

<a href="#_ednref22" id="_edn22">22</a>Id. at *2.

<a href="#_ednref23" id="_edn23">23</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref24" id="_edn24">24</a>Id. at *3.

<a href="#_ednref25" id="_edn25">25</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref26" id="_edn26">26</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref27" id="_edn27">27</a>Id. at *4 (reversing trial court’s order on petition for instructions and remanding for further proceedings).

<a href="#_ednref28" id="_edn28">28</a>Id. at *3.

<a href="#_ednref29" id="_edn29">29</a>Stillson Estate, 2010 WL 2594930, at *4, quoting Burke v Central Trust Co, 258 Mich 588, 592; 242 NW 760 (1932).

<a href="#_ednref30" id="_edn30">30</a> J. Martin and M. Harder, Estates and Protected Individuals Code with Reporters’ Commentary Section 700.7415, Reporter's Comment (ICLE 2011), citing Miller v National Bank of Detroit, 325 Mich 395; 38 NW2d 863 (1949); Stone v Stone, 319 Mich 194; 29 NW2d 271 (1947); Kobylinski v Szeliga, 307 Mich 306; 11 NW2d 899 (1943); Scott v Grow, 301 Mich 226; 3 NW2d 254 (1942); Schoefield v Veenboer, 234 Mich 147; 207 NW 898 (1926).

<a href="#_ednref31" id="_edn31">31</a>Hope Trust, 2010 WL 1573794, at *1.

<a href="#_ednref32" id="_edn32">32</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref33" id="_edn33">33</a>Id. at *2.

<a href="#_ednref34" id="_edn34">34</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref35" id="_edn35">35</a>Id. (reversing trial court’s judgment granting successor trustee’s motion for summary disposition).

<a href="#_ednref36" id="_edn36">36</a> MCL 700.7101 et seq.

<a href="#_ednref37" id="_edn37">37</a> MCL 700.7415.

<a href="#_ednref38" id="_edn38">38</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref39" id="_edn39">39</a> J. Martin and M. Harder, Estates and Protected Individuals Code with Reporters’ Commentary Section 700.7415, Reporter's Comment (ICLE 2011).

<a href="#_ednref40" id="_edn40">40</a>Stillson Estate, 2010 WL 2594930, at *1 (Mich App).

<a href="#_ednref41" id="_edn41">41</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref42" id="_edn42">42</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref43" id="_edn43">43</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref44" id="_edn44">44</a>Id. at *2.

<a href="#_ednref45" id="_edn45">45</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref46" id="_edn46">46</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref47" id="_edn47">47</a>Id. at *4.

<a href="#_ednref48" id="_edn48">48</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref49" id="_edn49">49</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref50" id="_edn50">50</a>Id. (reversing Probate Court’s judgment on petition for determination of testamentary takers).

<a href="#_ednref51" id="_edn51">51</a>Id. at *5 (J. Markey, dissenting), quoting Superior Hotels, LLC v Mackinaw Twp, 282 Mich App 621, 629; 765 NW2d 31 (2009) (citation and emphasis omitted in original).

<a href="#_ednref52" id="_edn52">52</a>Id. at *5 (Mich App).

<a href="#_ednref53" id="_edn53">53</a>Id. at *4.

<a href="#_ednref54" id="_edn54">54</a>Crane Trust, 2010 WL 4905205, at *1 (Mich App)

<a href="#_ednref55" id="_edn55">55</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref56" id="_edn56">56</a>Id. at *2.

<a href="#_ednref57" id="_edn57">57</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref58" id="_edn58">58</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref59" id="_edn59">59</a>Id. at *3.

<a href="#_ednref60" id="_edn60">60</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref61" id="_edn61">61</a>Id. at *4.

<a href="#_ednref62" id="_edn62">62</a>Id. (emphasis in original).

<a href="#_ednref63" id="_edn63">63</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref64" id="_edn64">64</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref65" id="_edn65">65</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref66" id="_edn66">66</a>Id.

<a href="#_ednref67" id="_edn67">67</a>Id. at *4-*5.

<a href="#_ednref68" id="_edn68">68</a>Id. at *5.

<a id="_edn69" href="#_ednref69">69</a>Id.

Source: Michigan Probate &amp; Estate Planning Journal (Vol. 31, No. 1)

Loath To Supplement the Language: 2010 Michigan Appellate Decisions Concerning Extrinsic Evidence of Testator’s or Settlor’s Intent

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