On Monday, October 24, 2011, the Michigan Supreme Court denied 102 applications for leave to appeal, 11 motions for reconsideration, and remanded two cases to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration as on leave granted of the Court of Appeals' previous orders denying appellants' applications for leave to appeal.
The Court also remanded three cases which had been previously held in abeyance pending the Court's decision in similar cases.
In Hoffman v. Barrett, Case No. 141407, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the matter to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Ligons v. Crittenton Hosp., 490 Mich. 61 (2011). In Crittenton, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a defective affidavit of merit in a medical malpractice case may not be retroactively amended after the statute of limitations period has passed. Our previous post concerning the Court's decision in Crittenton, is here. Justice Cavanagh dissented from the order and noted that he would have granted leave to appeal. Justice Marilyn Kelly wrote that she would have grated leave to appeal to reconsider Ligons.
The Court also remanded two cases in light of its recent ruling in People v. Dowdy, 489 Mich. 373 (2011) that homeless sex offenders are not exempt from the reporting and notification requirements of the Sex Offender Registration Act ('sORA'). Our post discussing the Court's ruling in Dowdy can be found here.
In People v. Farquharson, Case No. 141761, the Court vacated the prior judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the matter to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Dowdy. In People v. Bell, Case No. 141340, the Court reversed the district court's order dismissing the charges and remanded the case back to the 12th District Court. In its order, the Supreme Court stated that even if he was homeless, Bell was obligated to inform officers within 10 days after he vacated his previously registered residence or domicile. Homelessness does not prevent a sex offender from complying with SORA's notification obligation. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court erred in concluding that the homeless defendant was not statutorily mandated to register 'something'. In both Farquharson and Bell, Justice Cavanagh dissented from the order remanding the case and noted he would have granted leave to appeal. Justice Marilyn Kelly wrote that she would have grated leave to appeal to reconsider Dowdy.